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Showing posts with label Treasury Dept/CFIUS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Treasury Dept/CFIUS. Show all posts

Saturday, May 23, 2020

TREASURY SANCTIONS IRAN'S INTERIOR MINISTER & SENIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IN CONNECTION WITH SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

TREASURY SANCTIONS IRAN'S INTERIOR MINISTER & SENIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IN CONNECTION WITH SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
republished below in full unedited for informational, educational and research 
purposes:
WASHINGTON Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against Iran’s Interior Minister for his role in serious human rights abuses against Iranians, as well as seven senior officials of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and a provincial commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Today’s action also targets the Bonyad Taavon NAJA, which is translated as LEF Cooperative Foundation, along with its director and members of the board of trustees. The LEF Cooperative Foundation is an economic collaborative controlled by the LEF and is active in Iran’s energy, construction, services, technology, and banking industries.
“The Iranian regime violently suppresses dissent of the Iranian people, including peaceful protests, through physical and psychological abuse,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “The United States will continue to hold accountable Iranian officials and institutions that oppress and abuse their own people.”
The LEF has played a key role in government crackdowns on protesters, and operates detention centers associated with physical and psychological abuses. The LEF has begun to crack down on Afghan migrants in Iran, sending them to deportation centers where the IRGC has reportedly coerced many into fighting for Iranian militias in Syria. In May 2020, the LEF was implicated in the torture and drowning of Afghan nationals attempting to cross into Iran.
This action is taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13553 of September 28, 2010, which imposes sanctions on certain persons with respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of Iran. On June 9, 2011, Treasury sanctioned the LEF and IRGC pursuant to E.O. 13553 for being responsible for or complicit in serious human rights abuses that have occurred since the disputed June 2009 presidential election and ensuing protests. The LEF has also been designated under separate authorities for its support to the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar Al-Assad in the civil conflict in Syria, which has resulted in the displacement and suffering of millions. The IRGC has also been designated under counterterrorism and counter proliferation authorities. Both organizations continue to be implicated in human rights abuses, including those involving the killing of Iranian protestors, most recently in November 2019 following widespread protests in Iran over an increase in gasoline prices. In November 2018, OFAC designated Ghavamin Bank for providing banking services and facilitating routine financial transactions for the LEF.
Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli
As the Iranian regime’s Interior Minister and chair of Iran’s National Domestic Security Council (NDSC), Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli (Rahmani Fazli) has responsibilities for overseeing internal security issues, including Iran’s LEF. Rahmani Fazli holds the title of “Deputy or Replacement Commander-in Chief of Police Forces”, as delegated to him by the Supreme Leader. Rahmani Fazli has issued orders authorizing the LEF to use lethal force in response to the November 2019 protests, resulting in violence against peaceful protestors and bystanders. His orders led to the killing of many protestors, including at least 23 minors.
In addition, the Ministry of the Interior is also responsible for issuing permits for peaceful gatherings. Under Rahmani Fazli’s tenure, which began in 2013, the LEF has been responsible for the commission of serious human rights abuses against Iranians on multiple occasions, including killing hundreds of Iranians. As the Interior Minister, Rahmani Fazli issued several public warnings to protestors discouraging them from gathering and emphasizing that the LEF would crack down. Further, under Fazli’s tenure, the Ministry has routinely denied permits, or granted permits and then denied security, for the gatherings. These gatherings have then been attacked by plainclothes individuals believed to be part of the intelligence and security apparatus. Additionally, Rahmani Fazli as chair of the NDSC was involved in the Iranian regime’s decision to impose the days-long internet blackout of the November 2019 protests.
Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for being an official of the Government of Iran or a person acting on behalf of the Government of Iran who is responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Iran or Iranian citizens or residents, or the family members of the foregoing, on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran. Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli is also being identified pursuant to E.O. 13599 as an official of the Government of Iran.
The Department of State is also publicly designating Rahmani Fazli under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020, for his involvement in gross violations of human rights. Rahmani Fazli and his immediate family members are barred from entering the United States.
Hossein Ashtari Fard and Ayoub Soleimani
OFAC is also designating Hossein Ashtari Fard (Ashtari), the Commander of the LEF since March 2015 and Ayoub Soleimani (Soleimani) is the Deputy Commander of the LEF, a position he was appointed to in 2018 by Ashtari with the approval of Iran’s Supreme Leader, pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the LEF.
During Ashtari’s tenure as commander, the LEF has been implicated in multiple cases of violence, including the reported killing of hundreds of Iranian protesters and several dozen children following nationwide protests against an increase in gasoline prices in November 2019. In addition, Ashtari also directs the LEF cyber police unit, an organization that monitors expressions of dissatisfaction with the Iranian regime, and has threatened to punish Iranians who use social media to organize protests.
Soleimani took an active role in the suppression of anti-hijab protests in July 2019, calling an improperly worn hijab an obvious crime. He issued statements that the security forces would forcefully confront women who were not abiding by the Iranian dress code.
Additionally, Ayoub Soleimani was appointed in April 2020 as the head of the Planning Directorate of the Armed Forces General Staff, the most senior military body in Iran, which was designated by OFAC in November 2019 pursuant to E.O. 13876 for being owned or controlled by the Supreme Leader of Iran.
Mohsen Fathi Zadeh, Yahya Mahmoodzadeh, Hamidreza Ashraq, and Mohammad Ali Noorinajad
Treasury is also taking action against a number of the LEF’s most senior officials: Mohsen Fathi Zadeh, the Chief of the Defense and Intelligence Organization of the LEF; Yahya Mahmoodzadeh, the Deputy of Planning and Budget for the LEF; Hamidraza Ashraq, the Deputy of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs for the LEF; and Mohammad Ali Noorinajad, the Deputy Coordinator of the LEF. Noorinajad has publically praised the LEF for its role in suppressing the November 2019 protests, referring to the protestors as rebels, villains, and opportunists.
Mohsen Fathi Zadeh, Yahya Mahmoodzadeh, Hamidraza Ashraq and Mohammad Ali Noorinajad are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the LEF.
Hassan Shahvarpour Najafabadi
Hassan Shahvarpour Najafabadi (Shahvarpour) is an IRGC Brigadier General and the Commander of the IRGC’s Vali Asr Base in Khuzestan province, and he served in the position during the IRGC’s violent suppression of protestors in November 2019. In this province and the city of Mahshahr alone, the IRGC killed at least 100 protestors in a three-day period. Shahvarpour was designated in January 2020 by the State Department under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 2020, for his involvement in gross violations of human rights against protestors during the November 2019 protests. Shahvarpour and his immediate family members are barred from entering the United States.
Today, Hassan Shahvarpour Najafabadi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC.
The LEF Cooperative Foundation and Habil Darvish
The LEF Cooperative Foundation is an economic collaborative controlled by the LEF that is active in Iran’s energy, construction, services, technology, and banking industries. It reportedly sold oil worth $180 million, profits of which were not repatriated to the government. The majority of the aforementioned LEF senior officials, including Ayoub Soleimani, Mohsen Fathi Zadeh, Yahya Mahmoodzadeh, Hamidraza Ashraq and Mohammad Ali Noorinajad, are, or have been, members of the board of the LEF Cooperative Foundation.
The LEF Cooperative Foundation is being designated today pursuant to E.O. 13553 for being owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, the LEF.
Habil Darvish is the Managing Director of the LEF Cooperative Foundation and Deputy of Engineering of the LEF. Habil Darvish is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, LEF Cooperative Foundation.
Sanctions Implications
All property and interests in property of these persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
In addition, non-U.S. persons that engage in certain transactions with the persons designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates a significant transaction for or on behalf of the persons designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.
For identifying information on the individuals and entity designated today, click here.

Thursday, April 9, 2020

GOVERNMENT'S CORONAVIRUS STIMULUS PROGRAM WILL MASSIVELY INCREASE NATIONAL DEBT

GOVERNMENT'S CORONAVIRUS STIMULUS
PROGRAM WILL MASSIVELY INCREASE
NATIONAL DEBT 
BY BOB ADELMANN
republished below in full unedited for informational, educational and research 
purposes:
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that the federal government would run a deficit this fiscal year of more than $1 trillion, or about five percent of the country’s gross domestic output of goods and services.
William Foster, the lead U.S. analyst at Moody’s, the credit rating agency, says the deficit, thanks to the CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security) Act, will instead likely approach 10 percent of GDP, while Fitch Ratings is predicting it will be closer to 13 percent. Either way, they both predict that the deficit this year will exceed the previous post-World War II record for the deficit, set in 2009, when it was 9.8 percent of GDP.
The CARES Act is injecting an expected $2 trillion of new money into the economy in order “to provide emergency assistance and health care response for individuals, families, and businesses affected by the 2020 coronavirus pandemic,” according to the act’s complete title. Other credit facilities, by loosening credit requirements, are expected to add up to another $4 trillion, with talks currently underway for CARES 2.0 to add even more new money to the economy.
None of this was taken into account by Truth in Lending, the non-partisan think tank that promotes “transparent government financial information,” when it published its latest report on the nation’s current financial condition on April 7. Instead of repeating the canard that the national debt is only around $23 trillion, it reported that the federal government actually owes more than $113 trillion when “off-budget” items such as Social Security and Medicare are added back in.
For this, the think tank gave the federal government a financial grade of “F.”
David Stockman, President Ronald Reagan’s director of the Office of Management and Budget from 1981-1985, called the move to flood the economy with new money the “greatest folly”:
[CARES] is the greatest folly ever to beset our [country and] is now racing full speed ahead.
Instead of belt-tightening, work-arounds, payment deferrals and negotiated price and wage adjustments for a few months … current and future taxpayers are being saddled with trillions of unnecessary obligations, which will prove to be the final straw on the debt-ridden camel’s back….
Because the ship-of-fools in the Eccles Building [the Fed headquarters] have led Washington and Wall Street alike to believe in what amounts to the greatest lie in financial history: that we can borrow and print our way back to prosperity!
One of those riding in Stockman’s ship of fools is Neil Irwin. Trained in Keynesian economics at Columbia University and previously a columnist and reporter at the Washington Post, Irwin declared that that printing and borrowing was “a good thing.” He wrote, “The only thing worse for the public debt outlook would be if it didn’t [borrow].”
He added, “The very large deficits on the way in 2020 are more likely to leave the United States in a better fiscal situation for the years ahead than an alternative in which the government is more tightfisted but fails to prevent the widespread collapse of American businesses or help workers in desperate financial straits.”
He claims that the borrowing won’t cost much, as interest rates, thanks to the Fed, are way below normal. Besides, said Irwin, “this spending is meant to last only as long as needed.… It should be a one-time increase to public debt rather than an increase to permanent deficits.”
In addition, writes Irwin, the government’s budget can’t be compared to a household budget, because “the government never need pay down its debt … the debt can remain on the books indefinitely.”
With this as the financial mindset ruling Washington and the Fed, one can expect few conversations about how such folly ends. For those ready to see how it ended in Zimbabwe, Philip Haslam’s When Money Destroys Nations: How Hyperinflation Ruined Zimbabwe, How Ordinary People Survived, and Warnings for Nations that Print Money gives abundant evidence as to where Stockman’s ship of fools is taking us.

Tuesday, April 7, 2020

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION: ABORTION IS "ESSENTIAL" DURING CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION: 
ABORTION IS "ESSENTIAL" DURING CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC
republished below in full unedited for informational, educational and research 
purposes from: 
https://dailycaller.com/2020/04/04/who-abortion-essential-
coronavirus-covid-19/

Abortion is considered an essential service during the coronavirus pandemic, the World Health Organization said in a statement Saturday.
The WHO said in its statement to the Daily Caller News Foundation that “services related to reproductive health are considered to be part of essential services during the COVID-19 outbreak.”
“Women’s choices and rights to sexual and reproductive health care should be respected, irrespective of whether or not she has a suspected or confirmed COVID-19 infection,” WHO said in the statement. (RELATED: Top WHO Official Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus Won Election With China’s Help. Now He’s Running Interference For China On Coronavirus)
The statement also said that “sexual and reproductive health care is integral to universal health coverage and achieving the right to health.”
“This includes contraception, quality health care during and after pregnancy and childbirth, and safe abortion to the full extent of the law,” the organization added, noting that the WHO provides both global technology and policy guidance to WHO members “on the use of contraception to prevent unintended pregnancy, safe abortion, and treatment of complications from unsafe abortion.”
Governors and health departments across the United States have issued decisions on whether or not abortions are considered essential services. Texas, Ohio, Oklahoma, Indiana and Iowa as well as the governor of Mississippi declared abortions non-essential and banned these procedures to preserve PPE for fighting coronavirus. (RELATED: WHO Official Defends China, Says Everyone Is ‘Over-Focused’ On Regime’s Coronavirus Numbers)
Meanwhile, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Indiana, New Jersey, Illinois, Oregon, Hawaii and Virginia — all states that have banned elective medical procedures — deemed abortions essential during the outbreak.
There have been 1,172,692 cases of the coronavirus worldwide as of Saturday afternoon, and 62,823 people have died from the virus.
________________________________________________________

CHINA CONTROLS THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION


This is what globalism looks like

BY JON BOWNE
SEE: https://www.infowars.com/china-controls-the-world-health-organization/republished below in full unedited for informational, educational and research purposes:
The Chinese Government’s dominance of propaganda is as slick as it is nearly invisible and you wouldn’t think that Chinese propaganda had dug its claws as deep and wide as they have.
And as the Chinese Belt and Road initiative plows a path for the globalist fever dream of a Chinese century, the pawns of the powerful have looked to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the World Health Organization for professional, unwavering guidance throughout the coronavirus hysteria.
Many people are completely unaware of how locked in with China these organizations are.



TREASURY DESIGNATES VAST NETWORK OF IRGC-QF OFFICIALS & FRONT COMPANIES IN IRAQ, IRAN

TREASURY DESIGNATES VAST NETWORK OF IRGC-QF OFFICIALS & FRONT COMPANIES 
IN IRAQ, IRAN 
republished below in full unedited for informational, educational and research 
purposes:
WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today designated 20 Iran- and Iraq-based front companies, senior officials, and business associates that provide support to or act for or on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) in addition to transferring lethal aid to Iranian-backed terrorist militias in Iraq such as Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). Among other malign activities, these entities and individuals perpetrated or supported: smuggling through the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr; money laundering through Iraqi front companies; selling Iranian oil to the Syrian regime; smuggling weapons to Iraq and Yemen; promoting propaganda efforts in Iraq on behalf of the IRGC-QF and its terrorist militias; intimidating Iraqi politicians; and using funds and public donations made to an ostensibly religious institution to supplement IRGC-QF budgets. The terrorist militias supported by the Iranian regime such as KH and AAH have continued to engage in attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq.
“Iran employs a web of front companies to fund terrorist groups across the region, siphoning resources away from the Iranian people and prioritizing terrorist proxies over the basic needs of its people,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “The United States maintains broad exceptions and authorizations for humanitarian aid including agriculture commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices to help the people of Iran combat the coronavirus.”
Today’s designations were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, which targets terrorists and those providing support to or acting for or on behalf of designated terrorists or supporting acts of terrorism.

RECONSTRUCTION ORGANIZATION OF THE HOLY SHRINES IN IRAQ

The Reconstruction Organization of the Holy Shrines in Iraq (ROHSI) is an IRGC-QF-controlled organization based in Iran and Iraq whose leadership was appointed by the late IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani. Though ostensibly a religious institution, ROHSI has transferred millions of dollars to the Iraq-based Bahjat al Kawthar Company for Construction and Trading Ltd, also known as Kosar Company, another Iraq-based entity under the IRGC-QF’s control. Kosar Company has served as a base for Iranian intelligence activities in Iraq, including the shipment of weapons and ammunition to Iranian-backed terrorist militia groups. 
Additionally, Kosar Company has received millions of dollars in transfers from the Central Bank of Iran, which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in September 2019 for its financial support of the IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hizballah. Both the IRGC-QF and Hizballah have been designated by the U.S. Department of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
In addition, IRGC-QF officials have used ROHSI’s funds to supplement IRGC-QF budgets, likely embezzling public donations intended for the construction and maintenance of Shiite shrines in Iraq. 
ROHSI and Kosar Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF.
OFAC is also designating Mohammad Jalal Maab, the current head of ROHSI, who was personally appointed to the position by former IRGC-QF Commander Soleimani. Jalal Maab succeeded Hassan Pelarak, an IRGC-QF officer and co-owner of Kosar Company, who was selected by Soleimani to serve as his special assistant on an IRGC-QF-led committee focused on sanctions evasions activity. Pelarak also worked with IRGC-QF officials to transfer missiles, explosives, and small arms to Yemen, intensifying the Yemeni conflict and exacerbating one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes.
Mohammad Jalal Maab is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being a leader or official of ROHSI. Hassan Pelarak is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF. 
Alireza Fadakar, another co-owner of Kosar Company, has worked in Iraq on behalf of the IRGC-QF for several years and is an IRGC-QF commander in Najaf, Iraq. Muhammad al-Ghorayfi is an IRGC-QF affiliate and employee of Kosar Company who provides administrative support to Fadakar and has facilitated the travel of IRGC-QF officials between Iraq and Iran.
Alireza Fadakar is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF. Muhammad al-Ghorayfi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Alireza Fadakar.
Masoud Shoustaripousti, another co-owner of Kosar Company, has worked in Iraq on behalf of the IRGC-QF for several years and has laundered money for the group. Shoushtaripousti worked with Mashallah Bakhtiari, who used Kosar Company to launder money and worked with officials at the Baghdad-based branch of Iran’s Bank Melli to deposit funds for the IRGC-QF in Iraq. OFAC designated Bank Melli in November 2018, pursuant to E.O. 13224, for acting as a conduit for payments to the IRGC-QF which also used Bank Melli to dispense funds to Iranian-backed terrorist groups in Iraq.
Masoud Shoustaripousti is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF. Mashallah Bakhtiari is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.

AL KHAMAEL MARITIME SERVICES

Separately, OFAC is taking action against Al Khamael Maritime Services (AKMS), an Iraq-based company operating out of Umm Qasr port in which the IRGC-QF has a financial interest. The IRGC-QF leveraged Shiite militia group contacts to evade Iraqi government inspection protocol at Umm Qasr port and has charged foreign companies and vessels fees for services at its terminal at the port. AKMS also worked to sell Iranian-origin petroleum products in contravention of U.S. sanctions against the Iranian regime.
AKMS is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF. 
OFAC is also designating Hasan Saburinezhad, also known as Engineer Morteza, who is involved in the finances of AKMS. As a representative of AKMS, Saburinezhad worked to facilitate the entry of Iranian shipments into Iraqi ports for the benefit of the IRGC-QF. Saburinezhad is also involved in IRGC-QF financial and economic activities between Iran, Iraq, and Syria, including smuggling activities along the Syria/Iraq border. Saburinezhad also runs smuggling routes to help Iraqi terrorist group KH and the IRGC-QF smuggle goods into Iraq from Iran, and has assisted KH in funding the acquisition and transfer of goods out of Iran.  
Saburinezhad is the Managing Director and a member of the board of directors of Mada’in Novin Traders (MNT), an Iran- and Iraq-based company associated with multiple IRGC-QF officials, including Vali Gholizadeh, who has worked with Saburinezhad for the benefit of both AKMS and MNT. 
Hasan Saburinezhad is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF. Mada’in Novin Traders is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Saburinezhad. Gholizadeh is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being a leader or official of Mada’in Novin Traders.
OFAC is also designating Mohammed Saeed Odhafa Al Behadili, the Managing Director of AKMS, and Ali Hussein Falih Al-Mansoori, also known as Seyyed Rezvan, the company’s deputy managing director and head of its board of directors. Additionally, as of 2018, Al Behadili was focused on facilitating shipments and business transactions to circumvent U.S. sanctions against the Iranian regime. Al-Mansoori has worked with IRGC-QF officials on business issues related to AKMS. 
Mohammed Saeed Odhafa Al Behadili is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, AKMS. Ali Hussein Falih Al-Mansoori is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being a leader or official of AKMS.
Sayyed Reza Musavifar, who is responsible for the accounts and finances of AKMS, has worked with the IRGC-QF to transfer money to terrorist militias, including KH and Lebanese Hizballah. In 2014, Musavifar transferred the equivalent of millions of dollars of foreign currency to senior IRGC-QF officials. 
Musavifar is a part owner of Middle East Saman Chemical Company, an Iran-based company that maintained an account at Rashed Exchange, an Iran-based exchange house used to convert currency for the IRGC-QF that was designated in May 2018 for being owned or controlled by Mohammadreza Khedmati, an individual designated for support to the IRGC-QF. 
Sayyed Reza Musavifar is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. Middle East Saman Chemical Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sayyed Reza Musavifar.
Additionally, Ali Farhan Asadi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, AKMS.

SAYYED YASER MUSAVIR AND MEHDI GHASEMZADEH

IRGC-QF official Sayyed Yaser Musavir has been deployed to Iraq extensively since early 2014 in support of the IRGC-QF, and he has coordinated operations between the group and Iraqi terrorist militia group officials. In 2019, Musavir coordinated with IRGC-QF officials to sell Iranian petroleum products to Syria. In 2018, Musavir coordinated propaganda efforts with AAH on behalf of senior IRGC-QF officials. AAH was designated in January 2020 by the U.S. Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224.
Sayyed Yaser Musavir is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF.
Mehdi Ghasemzadeh is an IRGC-QF official and is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF.

SHAYKH ‘ADNAN AL-HAMIDAWI

Shaykh ‘Adnan Al-Hamidawi is a Special Operations Commander for KH who in 2019 planned to intimidate Iraqi politicians who did not support the removal of U.S. forces from Iraq. KH, an Iranian-backed terrorist militia group that has been a U.S. Department of State-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and SDGT since 2009, receives lethal support from the IRGC-QF, and has been responsible for numerous terrorist acts against Iraqi, U.S., and Coalition forces in Iraq for over a decade, including bombings, rocket attacks, and sniper operations.  
Shaykh ‘Adnan Al-Hamidawi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KH.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these persons that are in or come within the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve and property or interests in property of blocked persons.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the persons designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of individuals and entities designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent account or payable-through account sanctions.
####

Saturday, January 25, 2020

TREASURY TARGETS INTERNATIONAL NETWORK SUPPORTING IRAN'S PETROCHEMICAL & PETROLEUM INDUSTRIES

TREASURY TARGETS INTERNATIONAL NETWORK SUPPORTING IRAN'S PETROCHEMICAL & PETROLEUM INDUSTRIES 
republished below in full unedited for informational, educational and research 
purposes:
WASHINGTON Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against four international petrochemical and petroleum companies that have collectively transferred the equivalent of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of exports from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), an entity instrumental in Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical industries, which helps to finance Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and its terrorist proxies. Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical industries are major sources of revenue for the Iranian regime and funds its malign activities throughout the Middle East. The entities targeted today facilitate Iran’s petrochemical and petroleum exports in contravention of U.S. economic sanctions.
“Iran’s petrochemical and petroleum sectors are primary sources of funding for the Iranian regime’s global terrorist activities and enable its persistent use of violence against its own people,” said Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin.
Today’s action follows on the heels of similar actions that have targeted key sources of funding for Iranian regional adventurism, including a recent action targeting the Iranian metals sector. Also, in June 2019, OFAC designated Iran’s largest petrochemical holding group, Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC), for providing financial support to U.S.-designated Khatam al-Anbya Construction Headquarters, the engineering conglomerate of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).  In addition to PGPIC, OFAC designated PGPIC’s vast network of 39 subsidiary petrochemical companies and foreign-based sales agents.  
Today’s action targets Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (Triliance), a Hong Kong-based broker with branches in Iran, United Arab Emirates, China, and Germany. 
In 2019, Triliance ordered the transfer of the equivalent of millions of dollars to NIOC as payment for Iranian petrochemicals, crude oil, and petroleum products shipped to the United Arab Emirates and China after the expiration of any applicable significant reduction exceptions.  In facilitating these shipments, Triliance worked to conceal the Iranian origin of these products.  Triliance has also facilitated the sale of millions of dollars’ worth of petroleum products involving Naftiran Intertrade Company, a subsidiary of NIOC, to companies in China. 
Additionally, Triliance Kish Petrochemical Company, which is the Iran-based branch of Triliance, recently changed its name and operates as Tiba Parsian Kish Petrochemical.  
Similarly, in 2019, Hong Kong-based Sage Energy HK Limited (Sage Energy) and Shanghai-based Peakview Industry Co. Limited (Peakview) each ordered the transfer of the equivalent of millions of dollars to NIOC for exports after the expiration of any applicable significant reduction exceptions. 
In 2019, Dubai-based Beneathco DMCC also ordered the transfer of the equivalent of several million dollars to NIOC.  In late 2018, Beneathco DMCC offered to assist NIOC in hiding the origin of Iranian products destined for the United Arab Emirates.
Triliance, Sage Energy, Peakview, and Beneathco DMCC are all designated pursuant to E.O 13846 for on or after November 5, 2018, having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, NIOC, a person included on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13599.
Concurrently with the U.S. Department of Treasury’s designations, the U.S. Department of State designated several companies and senior executives pursuant to E.O. 13846 in connection with significant transactions for the transport of petrochemical products from Iran, on or after November 5, 2018.
Sanctions Implications 
All property and interests in property of these persons designated today subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.  In addition, foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for, or persons that provide material or certain other support to, the persons designated today risk exposure to sanctions that could sever their access to the U.S. financial system or block their property and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction.

Saturday, January 11, 2020

TREASURY TARGETS IRAN'S BILLION DOLLAR METALS INDUSTRY & SENIOR REGIME OFFICIALS

TREASURY TARGETS IRAN'S BILLION DOLLAR METALS INDUSTRY & SENIOR REGIME OFFICIALS 
republished below in full unedited for informational, educational and research 
purposes:
Action coincides with President’s Executive Order expanding authorities to target additional sources of revenue used by the Iranian regime 
WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against eight senior Iranian regime officials who have advanced the regime’s destabilizing objectives, as well as the largest steel, aluminum, copper, and iron manufacturers in Iran, who collectively generate billions of dollars annually.  Treasury’s action includes the designations of Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council; Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Iranian armed forces; and Gholamreza Soleimani, the head of the Basij militia of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).  In addition, Treasury designated 17 Iranian metals producers and mining companies; a network of three China- and Seychelles-based entities; and a vessel involved in the purchase, sale, and transfer of Iranian metals products, as well as in the provision of critical metals production components to Iranian metal producers.
Concurrently with today’s designations, the President is signing a new Executive Order (E.O.) that targets additional sources of revenue used by the Iranian regime to fund and support its nuclear program, missile development, terrorism and terrorist proxy networks, and malign regional influence. Specifically, this E.O. authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions against persons operating in or transacting with additional sectors of the Iranian economy, including construction, mining, manufacturing, and textiles.
“The United States is targeting senior Iranian officials for their involvement and complicity in Tuesday’s ballistic missile strikes,” said Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “We are also designating Iran’s largest metals manufacturers, and imposing sanctions on new sectors of the Iranian economy including construction, manufacturing, and mining. These sanctions will continue until the regime stops the funding of global terrorism and commits to never having nuclear weapons.”  

FOREIGN PURCHASERS AND TRANSPORTERS OF IRANIAN STEEL, AND PROVIDERS OF CRITICAL MATERIALS NEEDED FOR IRANIAN METAL PRODUCTION

Since August 2019, Beijing-based trading company Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd. has purchased tens of thousands of metric tons of steel slabs on a monthly basis from Iran’s Esfahan Mobarakeh Steel Company.
During 2019, Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd. has sold multiple consignments of carbon blocks, cathode blocks, and graphite electrodes to Iranian minerals trading firm Khalagh Tadbir Pars Co. for shipment to Iran and use by Iranian metals producers.  Since August 2019, Khalagh Tadbir Pars Co. has purchased materials including carbon blocks and cathode blocks from Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd. for ultimate end-use by the Iran Aluminum Company. 
Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd. has also facilitated Khalagh Tadbir Pars Co.’s purchase of materials such as cathodes from Chinese manufacturers.  Additionally, in November 2019, Khalagh Tadbir Pars Co. and Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd. coordinated the sale of Iranian copper concentrates to a Chinese purchaser.
Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd. is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13871 for having knowingly engaged, on or after the date of the E.O. 13871, in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of iron, iron products, aluminum, aluminum products, steel, steel products, copper, or copper products from Iran, as well as for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or service in support of Khalagh Tadbir Pars Co.
Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd. uses Power Anchor Limited, located in the Seychelles, as a front company to obfuscate the true Iranian end-user for metals-related materials shipped to Iran.  Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd. has also used Power Anchor Limited to facilitate payments from Iranian steel companies for purchases of graphite electrodes used in metal production brokered by Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd.  Power Anchor Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13871 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd.
In September 2019, the vessel Hong Xun transported steel slabs purchased by Pamchel Trading Beijing Co. Ltd. from Esfahan Mobarakeh Steel Company from Bandar Abbas, Iran, to China.  Hongyuan Marine Co. Ltd., located in Zhejian, China, is the registered owner of the vessel Hong Xun, as well as the vessel’s Ship Manager/Commercial Manager.  Hongyuan Marine Co. Ltd. is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13871 for having knowingly engaged, on or after the date of E.O. 13871, in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of iron, iron products, aluminum, aluminum products, steel, steel products, copper, or copper products from Iran through its vessel, Hon Xun.  OFAC is also identifying the Hong Xun as blocked property in which Hongyuan Marine Co. Ltd. has an interest.

IRANIAN IRON AND STEEL COMPANIES AND OMAN-BASED SUPPLIER  

Today’s action targets the 13 largest steel and iron manufacturers in Iran, who collectively generate billions in sales annually.
Mobarakeh Steel Company is the biggest steel producer in the Middle East and the biggest direct reduced iron producer in the world.  Mobarakeh Steel Company produces more than 50 percent of Iran’s steel in all major markets.  OFAC previously designated Mobarakeh Steel Company in October 2018 pursuant to E.O. 13224, a counterterrorism authority, for providing material support to Mehr Eqtesead Iranian Investment Company, an IRGC-affiliated entity.
In addition to Mobarakeh, OFAC is designating Saba Steel, Hormozgan Steel CompanyEsfahan Steel CompanyOxin Steel CompanyKhorasan Steel CompanySouth Kaveh Steel Company, Iran Alloy Steel Company, Golgohar Mining and Industrial CompanyChadormalu Mining and Industrial CompanyArfa Iron and Steel CompanyKhouzestan Steel Company, and Iranian Ghadir Iron & Steel Co pursuant to E.O. 13871 for operating in the iron, steel, aluminum, or copper sectors of Iran.
OFAC is also designating Oman-based Reputable Trading Source LLC, which is owned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Khouzestan Steel Company.  Reputable Trading Source LLC was incorporated to provide and supply the spare parts, equipment, and raw material that is required by steel companies, and further engages in marketing and exporting steel products from Iran.

IRANIAN ALUMINUM AND COPPER COMPANIES

OFAC is also taking action against the top companies operating in the Iranian aluminum and copper sectors.
Iran Aluminum Company was established as the first producer of aluminum bricks in Iran, and accounts for approximately 75 percent of the country’s total aluminum production volume.  Also designated today is Al-Mahdi Aluminum Corporation, a top producer of aluminum in Iran, and National Iranian Copper Industries, the leading copper producer in the Middle East and North Africa region.  Khalagh Tadbir Pars Co. is a minerals trading firm that deals in iron ore, copper concentrate, alumina, and aluminum.
Iran Aluminum Company, Al-Mahdi Aluminum Corporation, National Iranian Copper Industries, and Khalagh Tadbir Pars Co. are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13871 for operating in the iron, steel, aluminum, or copper sectors of Iran.

ALI SHAMKHANI AND GHOLAMREZA SOLEIMANI

OFAC is designating Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), who was appointed by the Supreme Leader in September 2013 as one of his representatives to the SNSC.  Ali Shamkhani, an IRGC admiral, is currently the secretary of the SNSC, which determines the country’s security and defense policies and coordinates political, intelligence, social, and economic activities in accordance with the Supreme Leader’s guidelines.
As the head of the SNCS, Ali Shamkhani plays a key role in implementation of the Supreme Leader’s domestic and foreign policies.   
Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani was appointed by the Supreme Leader on July 2, 2019 as the Commander of the Basij Resistance Force, a paramilitary force subordinate to IRGC. Among other malign activities, the IRGC’s Basij militia recruits, trains, and deploys child soldiers to fight in IRGC-fueled conflicts across the region.  

MOHSEN REZA’I AND MOHAMMAD REZA NAQDI

Mohsen Reza’i is a longtime member of Iran’s Expediency Council and was appointed by the Supreme Leader.  The Expediency Council provides guidance to the Supreme Leader on all manner of policy.  Reza’i is a former IRGC commander who is suspected of involvement in the 1994 terrorist attack against the AMIA Jewish community in Argentina, resulting in the deaths of 85 people.  Reza’i remains wanted by Argentina and has an active international arrest warrant through Interpol.
Mohammad Reza Naqdi was appointed by the Supreme Leader as the Deputy Coordinator of the IRGC in May 2019.  Naqdi is the former Commander of the Basij, as well as a former head of the Basij intelligence unit who was responsible for the interrogation of those arrested during the post-election crackdown in 2009.  In this role, he extracted forced confessions from high-ranking reformist leaders broadcast on Iranian state-run television.  As a result of his actions in the aftermath of the 2009 protests, Naqdi was previously designated by Treasury in 2011 pursuant to E.O. 13553, a human rights authority.

MOHAMMAD REZA ASHTIANI AND ALI ABDOLLAHI

Mohammad Reza Ashtiani and Ali Abdollahi are senior Iranian military appointees of the Supreme Leader.  Ashtiani was appointed by the Supreme Leader as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces in July 2019, while IRGC Brigadier General Abdollahi was appointed the Coordination Deputy for the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) in July 2016.  Abdollahi is a former Deputy Commander of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces.  OFAC previously designated the AFGS and its chief, IRGC General Mohammed Bagheri, pursuant to E.O. 13876 in November 2019.
Ali Shamkhani, Gholamreza Soleimani, Mohsen Reza’i, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, Mohammad Reza Ashtiani and Ali Abdollahi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13876 for being persons appointed to a position as a state official of Iran by the Supreme Leader.

ALI ASGHAR HEJAZI AND MOHSEN QOMI

Ali Asghar Hejazi is a senior official within the Supreme Leader’s Office in charge of security.  Hejazi also maintains close links to the IRGC’s Qods Force.  Hejazi was previously designated in May 2013 pursuant to E.O. 13553, a human rights authority, for supporting the commission of serious human rights abuses in Iran on or after June 12, 2009, as well as for providing material support to the IRGC and Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
Mohsen Qomi, a Deputy Advisor for International Affairs in the Supreme Leader’s Office and an advisor to the Supreme Leader on International Communications, has represented the Supreme Leader on official international visits.
Hejazi and Qomi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13876 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Supreme Leader.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

All property and interests in property of these persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC.  OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons. 
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the persons designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions.  Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates a significant transaction for or on behalf of the persons designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.

Wednesday, September 25, 2019

U.S. TREASURY SANCTIONS IRAN'S CENTRAL BANK & NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND

U.S. TREASURY SANCTIONS IRAN'S CENTRAL BANK & NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND 
republished below in full unedited for informational, educational and research purposes:
Action targets major sources of funding for the regime’s proxies and terrorist arms, including the IRGC, the Qods Force, Hizballah and the Houthis
WASHINGTON- Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), the National Development Fund of Iran (NDF), and Etemad Tejarate Pars Co. under its counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224.  Iran’s Central Bank has provided billions of dollars to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), its Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and its terrorist proxy, Hizballah.  Iran’s NDF, which is Iran’s sovereign wealth fund and whose board of trustees include Iran’s president, oil minister, and the governor of the Central Bank, has been a major source of foreign currency and funding for the IRGC-QF and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).  Etemad Tejarate Pars, also designated today, is an Iran-based company that is used to conceal financial transfers for MODAFL’s military purchases, including funds originating from the NDF.
“Iran’s brazen attack against Saudi Arabia is unacceptable.  Treasury’s action targets a crucial funding mechanism that the Iranian regime uses to support its terrorist network, including the Qods Force, Hizballah, and other militants that spread terror and destabilize the region.  The United States will continue its maximum pressure campaign against Iran’s repressive regime, which attempts to achieve its revolutionary agenda through regional aggression while squandering the country’s oil proceeds,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin.  “Iran’s Central Bank and the National Development Fund were ostensibly intended to safeguard the welfare of the Iranian people, but have been used instead by this corrupt regime to move Iran’s foreign currency reserves for terrorist proxies.”
“We are putting governments on notice that they are risking the integrity of their financial systems by continuing to work with the Iranian regime’s arm of terror finance, its Central Bank,” said Sigal Mandelker, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “We will vigorously enforce our sanctions to cut off the Iranian regime’s funding of global terrorism and its domestic oppression of the Iranian people, who are the regime’s longest suffering victims.”

CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN FUNDS THE IRGC, ITS QODS FORCE AND HIZBALLAH

Today’s action targets the CBI for its financial support to the IRGC-QF and Hizballah.  In May 2018, OFAC designated the CBI’s then-Governor Valiollah Seif, and the Assistant Director of the International Department Ali Tarzali, for facilitating financial transfers for the IRGC-QF and Hizballah.  Also, in November 2018 and as part of Treasury’s disruption of an international oil-for-terror network, OFAC designated the CBI’s International Department Director Rasul Sajjad, and the CBI’s International Department Director, Hossein Yaghoobi, for conducting financial transactions for the IRGC-QF.
Since at least 2016, the IRGC-QF has received the vast majority of its foreign currency from the CBI and senior CBI officials have worked directly with the IRGC-QF to facilitate CBI’s financial support to the IRGC-QF. In 2017, the IRGC-QF oversaw the transfer of tens of millions of euros to Iraq from the CBI. Then-Governor of the CBI Valiollah Seif directed the transfer.
During 2018 and early 2019, the CBI facilitated the transfer of several billion of U.S. dollars and euros to the IRGC-QF and hundreds of millions to MODAFL from the NDF.  Additionally, millions were to be transferred to the Houthis. CBI has also coordinated with the IRGC-QF to transfer funds to Hizballah.
OFAC is designating the CBI today for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, the IRGC-QF and Hizballah.
The IRGC-QF, which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007, is a branch of the IRGC responsible for external operations and has provided material support to numerous terrorist groups, including the Taliban, Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, making it a key component of Iran’s destabilizing regional activities. The IRGC, including its external arm, the IRGC-QF, was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on April 8, 2019.
Hizballah was designated by the Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1997 pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2001.  It was also designated in August 2012 pursuant to E.O. 13582, which targets the Government of Syria and its supporters.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND: A SLUSH FUND FOR THE IRGC-QF AND MODAFL

According to Article 84 of the Fifth Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the NDF was established to serve the welfare of the Iranian people by allocating revenues that originated from selling oil, gas, gas condensate, and oil products to durable wealth and productive economic investments.  However, the NDF has been used as a slush fund for the IRGC-QF, which has, for years, received hundreds of millions of dollars in cash disbursements from the NDF.
The NDF, in coordination with the CBI, provided the IRGC-QF with half a billion U.S. dollars in 2017 and hundreds of millions of dollars in 2018. Also, despite an increase in the IRGC’s overall budget for 2019, the Rouhani administration withdrew some $4.8 billion from the NDF in January 2019 to amend the budget allocated to the IRGC and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).
The IRIB was designated pursuant to E.O. 13628 in February 2013 for assisting or denying the free flow of information to or from the Iranian people. IRIB was implicated in censoring multiple media outlets and airing forced confessions from detainees.   
During 2018 and early 2019, the CBI facilitated the transfer of hundreds of millions to both the Atomic Energy Organization and MODAFL from the NDF.  Some of the funds to be transferred via Iran-based Etemad Tejarate Pars Co. were intended to be used for military purchases.
As of early 2019, Etemad Tejarate Pars Co. planned to send tens of millions in various currencies, including euros, to Wilmington General Trading LLC in Dubai, UAE, the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Moscow, Russia, and to companies on behalf of MODAFL.
OFAC is designating NDF for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, the IRGC-QF and MODAFL.
OFAC is designating Etemad Tejarate Pars Co. for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, MODAFL.
On March 26, 2019, OFAC designated MODAFL pursuant to E.O. 13224 for its role in assisting the IRGC-QF. Wilmington General Trading LLC was also designated on March 26, 2019 for being owned or controlled by Asadollah Seifi who obfuscated millions of dollars’ worth of transactions benefiting the Iranian regime and the purchase of foreign currency for the IRGC.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC.  OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation.  Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant financial transaction or provides significant financial services for entities designated in connection with Iran’s support for international terrorism or any Iranian person on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons could be subject to U.S. correspondent account or payable-through account sanctions.
The United States has a long standing policy of allowing for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine and medical devices, and OFAC will continue to consider requests related to humanitarian trade with Iran as appropriate.
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